The impact of WTO membership on bilateral trade remains a puzzle due, in part, to a failure of previous studies to simultaneously address three issues: inclusion of zero trade, and proper controls for multilateral resistance, and the proper de…nition of membership. Addressing all three yields little evidence of a positive e¤ect of the WTO.
Introduction
Ever since Rose (2004) solved the mystery by rede…ning the set of GATT or WTO participants. 1 According to the authors, Rose's (2004) failure to capture the role of colonies, de facto members and provisional members as nonmember participants led to a downward bias in the estimated WTO coe¢ cients. Using a new de…nition of participation, which includes both nonmember participants and formal members, they …nd positive and signi…cant e¤ects of WTO participation. Next, Subramanian and Wei (2007, p. 173) allude to "four asymmetries in the system" and consider the WTO to have done a "splendid" but "uneven" job in promoting trade.
However, they exclude zero trade observations. More recently, Liu (forthcoming) distinguishes between the WTO's roles at the intensive and extensive margins. While the former refers to promoting trade among existing trading partners, the latter involves encouraging new trading relationships. According to Liu (forthcoming), the aforementioned studies underestimate the e¤ects of membership by omitting the zero trade observations and thereby neglecting the extensive margin. While Liu (forthcoming) …nds a positive and signi…cant e¤ect of formal membership after including the zeros, the result remains questionable due to lack of proper controls for the theoretically motivated multilateral resistance terms. The remoteness proxy used is considered by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, p. 170) to be "at odds with the theory." 2 This paper contributes to the literature by estimating a theoretically consistent gravity model while avoiding the potential sample selection bias. In addition, sensitivity of the estimates to the two de…nitions of WTO membership -with and without the nonmember participants -is also analyzed. Using the data from Liu (forthcoming) at …ve year intervals, the results are striking. In the full sample, the use of neither de…nition …nds WTO countries to engage in signi…cantly greater bilateral trade. Separate regressions for each decade, which also control for bilateral …xed e¤ects, …nd membership to signi…cantly promote trade Tari¤s and Trade (GATT). 2 By excluding the zero trade observations, using bilateral …xed e¤ects, and estimating in levels, Liu (forthcoming) also …nds the WTO to be e¤ective at the intensive margin. However, the levels model also relies on the remoteness proxy.
and signi…cant WTO e¤ect is indeed a mystery, then the prospect of solving it by estimating a gravity model seems unlikely once zero trade observations and controls for the multilateral resistance terms are included. Accordingly, Rose's (2007 Rose's ( , p. 2025 desire to see the question addressed beyond the "con…nes of the gravity model" is timely.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical methodology.
Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 presents the results, while Section 5 concludes. 
Empirical Methodology
Here, T ijt is the real value of imports of country i from country j at time t; both ijt is a dummy variable taking the value one if both i and j are treated as WTO "members" at time t and zero otherwise; one ijt is a dummy variable taking the value one if either i or j is considered to be a WTO "member" at time t and zero otherwise; dist ij is the distance between i and j; border ij is a binary variable assuming the value unity if i and j share a land border; landlock ij and island ij are ordered discrete variables depicting the number of landlocked countries (0,1, or 2) and the number of islands (0,1, or 2), respectively, in each country pair;
is a dummy variable taking the value one if i and j share a common language (religion); colony ij (colonizer ij ) is a binary variable taking the value unity if i has ever been a colony (colonizer) of j; curcolony ijt (curcolonizer ijt ) is a dummy variable taking the value one if i is considered to be a colony (colonizer) of j at time t; comcol ij is a binary variable assuming the value unity if i and j were ever colonized by the same colonizer; hostility ij depicts the intensity of military con ‡ict between i and j; alliance ijt is a dummy variable taking the value one if i and j were in a formal alliance at time t; CU ijt (RT A ijt ) is a dummy variable taking the value one if i and j belong to the same currency union Finally, in order to include the zero trade observations, the dependent variable is considered to be ln (T ijt + 1), as in Liu (forthcoming). An alternative using ln T ijt + 2 q T 2 ijt + 1 as the dependent variable is also tried (see, e.g., Kukenova and Monteiro, 2008) . Since the two approaches yield very similar coe¢ cient estimates, only the former are included.
Data
The majority of the data come from Liu (forthcoming) for the years 1950 to 2000, at …ve year intervals. 2007), the use of either de…nition …nds country-pairs with one or two WTO members to engage in signi…cantly greater bilateral trade, relative to country-pairs with none. Hence, the inclusion of the zero trade observations appears to render any concern over the proper WTO de…nition unwarranted. However, before placing too much faith in these results, one needs to properly account for the multilateral resistance terms. Accordingly, the multilateral resistance terms are controlled for in columns (e) and (f). While the WTO dummies in column (e) correspond to formal membership, the participation de…nition is used for column (f). The results di¤er strikingly from those reported in columns (c) and (d).
In the theoretically consistent model, the use of neither de…nition …nds evidence in support of the WTO's trade promoting role. On an average, country-pairs with at least one WTO member engage in less bilateral trade. Interestingly, the …nding is again insensitive to the de…nition of membership adopted although the estimates are statistically signi…cant only when using the participation de…nition. Table 2 Although (a)-(d) include (log) GDP, (log) GDP per capita, (log) area, remoteness, and year dummies, the coefficient estimates are not reported.
* denotes statistical significance at the 95% level. 
